Concerns about attracting disproportionate numbers of employees with alcohol problems limit employers' willingness to offer health plans with generous alcohol treatment benefits. This paper analyzes two potential avenues of adverse selection, namely biased enrollment into plans and biased exit from plans offered by 57 employers between 1991 and 1997. We compare alcohol treatment use rates and costs of new and old enrollees between more generous and less generous plans; we also analyze disenrollment rates and enrollment duration by plan generosity for users and nonusers of alcohol treatment services. To avoid confounding benefit generosity with other plan features, in particular the use of managed care mechanisms, we compare plans that were administered in the same way by a large managed behavioral health care organization. Overall, we find no evidence of adverse selection into more generous plans. Contrary to the selection hypothesis, treatment costs of new members compared to old members are lower in firms with more generous treatment benefits than in firms with more limited benefits. Also, users of alcohol treatment services do not remain disproportionately enrolled longer in plans with generous benefits.
Researchers have pointed to adverse selection and moral hazard as primary reasons for why private sector insurance benefits for alcohol and other drug treatment continue to be very limited (Frank, McGuire, and Newhouse 1995; Frank, Huskamp, and McGuire 1996) . Employers remain wary about improving benefits for alcohol and drug treatment even as they offer more generous mental health coverage. An important reason is the concern that generous benefits attract likely users of alcohol and drug treatment services-people who are also likely to be more costly medical patients and less productive employees. However, no study to date has mea-sured the potential magnitude of adverse selection caused by generous alcohol and drug treatment benefits.
Concern about adverse selection has been fueled by recent research showing the dramatic effects of adverse selection in the employersponsored health plans at Harvard University and the University of California, where premium ''death spirals'' caused some types of coverage to disappear (Cutler and Zeckhauser 1997; Cutler and Reber 1998; Buchmueller 2000) . For employer-based health plans, the main data source for existing research has been the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), although there are disagreements over the extent to which adverse selection in that plan is problematic (Price and Mays 1985; Butler and Moffit 1995; Feldman, Dowd, and Coulam 1999) . Medicare is the other widely studied program and there generally is agreement that health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have enrolled healthier beneficiaries. However, neither the FEHBP nor Medicare studies analyzed selection related to treatment for alcohol problems.
The adverse selection literature describes situations where employees or program beneficiaries can switch easily among several plans. These are exceptional cases, however, and may be of limited relevance for typical employersponsored coverage. In reality, nearly all plan switching reflects changes in employment or in employer offerings (Cunningham and Kohn 2000) , and the majority of employers do not offer any choice among health plans (Long and Marquis 1999) . Even when a number of different plans are offered, increasing numbers of employers carve out substance abuse treatment through a uniform benefit that covers all employees regardless of their main medical plan (Frank, Huskamp, and McGuire 1996) . Published case studies of employers who have switched to generous mental health or substance abuse benefits often have involved such uniform carve-out benefits Sturm, Goldman, and McCulloch 1998) . Employers are the decision makers when it comes to how generously alcohol treatment is covered and their concern is about biased selection into their labor force. Fear of adverse selection into their employee pool would be the likely reason why employers would be hesitant to offer more comprehensive benefits for treating alcohol and drug abuse problems rather than the prospect of adverse selection from offering choice among multiple health plans.
The fact that obtaining more generous insurance coverage for alcohol or drug treatment services is tied largely to employment decisions does not mean that adverse selection is unimportant, or that employers' fears about adverse selection (into their labor force) are irrational. The scope for adverse selection through employment choices is potentially large given the high labor turnover rates (Ryscavage 1995) , combined with the limited availability of insur-ance coverage for substance abuse services and high costs of treatment. Much of this turnover is accounted for by multiple job changes among individuals with insecure labor market attachments. This category is comprised disproportionately of individuals with substance abuse problems (Kenkel and Wang 1998; Mullahy and Sindelar 1995; Kenkel and Ribar 1994) , exactly the group that employers are concerned about attracting when offering increased benefits. Biased disenrollment also may have a substantial effect on an employer's health insurance costs. For example, members dropping out of a plan with limited behavioral health benefits during the period 1993-95 incurred about 28% higher mental health care costs in the 1992 baseline year compared to members staying with the plan through the end of 1995 (Sturm 1999) . This study did not determine whether this effect was different in more generous plans (Sturm 1999) .
While the potential exists for important adverse selection effects, there are also reasons why they may be minor or nonexistent. Many individuals with alcohol problems do not perceive need for treatment, making generous benefits unlikely to be a salient feature in decisions about prospective employers. Moreover, decisions about health insurance often are made at the household level, and the policyholder is not necessarily the one for whom treatment is sought, suggesting that we need to separately analyze employees (who are the policyholders) and their dependents.
Informational problems pose another obstacle. While it may not be difficult for job seekers to obtain a general idea about which employer offers what type of health insurance, details about coverage details for alcohol, drug abuse, or mental health treatment may be less easy to come by. Such details often are not included on summary sheets. Alcohol and drug treatment services account for only a fraction of 1% of total benefits costs (which include sick leave, vacation, pension, and disability, in addition to health), and even some benefit managers may be unable to answer questions about such coverage without checking additional documentation. Moreover, job candidates are likely to be reluctant to make inquiries about the substance abuse benefits for fear of harming their employment prospects. Thus, the extent of adverse se-lection remains an empirical question for which this paper provides some first results. This paper analyzes two potential avenues of adverse selection, namely biased enrollment into plans and biased exit from plans offered by 57 employers between 1991 and 1997. For biased enrollment, we compare use rates and costs for new and old enrollees in more generous and less generous plans. For biased exit, we analyze disenrollment rates by plan generosity for users and nonusers of alcohol treatment services. To avoid confounding benefit generosity with other plan features, in particular the use of managed care mechanisms, we compare plans that were administered in the same way by a large managed behavioral health care organization (i.e., identical provider network, authorization procedures, case managers).
In the next section of the paper, we discuss the range of strategies used to study selection and the special measurement issues arising in the context of alcohol treatment in general, and in our application in particular. We then discuss our data source, analytic approach and limitations, followed by results, and a final section on implications for benefit design.
Strategies for Measuring Adverse Selection for Alcohol Abuse Treatment
Adverse selection occurs when individuals with unobserved higher preferences for medical treatment are more likely to select a particular health plan or employer than are people with lower preferences for treatment. The nature and strength of empirical tests of the selection hypothesis depend on available data. Ideal data would contain information about insurance coverage, available enrollment options, utilization, and health status over time, together with exogenous variations in enrollment options. Obtaining such data likely would require a complex and costly experimental design. Practical and ethical barriers to conducting social experiments mean that even leading studies of adverse selection have relied on much more limited data. For example, Medicare administrative data do not include information about health insurance coverage prior to Medicare eligibility, and data from employer-sponsored health insurance groups do not contain information about coverage and service use for employees during previous and subsequent jobs. In the absence of definitive data, we need to learn about selection through careful interpretation of results arising from a variety of studies with complementary strengths and weaknesses. The two broad data issues to consider in assessing the adequacy of alternative approaches to measuring selection are the period of time over which enrollment and service use are observable, and what the source of benefit variation is.
Timing of Service Use and Enrollment Data
Post-enrollment analysis. A common type of analysis focuses on service use after enrollment, comparing new against old enrollees. This type of post-enrollment analysis seems particularly relevant for situations where people may defer use until they enroll in a new plan offering broader services, obtain coverage for services to treat a particular condition, or have lower outof-pocket expenses. Maternity care, in particular, has been found to be susceptible to such ''stored-up'' utilization (Hudes et al. 1980; Robinson, Gardner, and Luft 1993) . Such increases are also likely if switching is related to unsatisfied needs prior to enrollment in the new plan. Another example of a post-enrollment comparison comes from Medicare, which reported that new enrollees in the traditional system (i.e., individuals who have switched out of HMOs) had 80% higher inpatient costs than continuously enrolled beneficiaries (Morgan et al. 1997 ). This adverse selection study focused on plan type as the source of adverse selection, not benefit generosity.
Treatment for alcohol problems, like vision or dental care, may be more discretionary than care for an acute health problem, and therefore be a likely candidate for ''stored-up'' utilization. In that case, the post-enrollment analysis should reveal at least an immediate spike in use among new members in more generous plans, even if there is no higher use in subsequent years. Of course, denial of alcohol abuse may limit decision makers' ability to use foresight in choosing among health benefit options. This limitation should be less relevant for new dependent members (i.e., plan members other than the employee) because enrollment may reflect preferences of the policyholders rather than their own. Our first analysis therefore compares whether new enrollees in more generous plans have higher expenditures than continuing members.
Pre-enrollment analysis. A complement to the post-enrollment analysis is to analyze service use prior to enrollment. This approach, however, has been criticized by Buchanan and Cretin (1986) , who argue that prior use overestimates the effect of selection bias. Nevertheless, pre-enrollment analyses often have been used to detect selection bias, under the assumption that past use will accurately predict future use. One such investigation was based on the Medical Outcomes Study, which found that depressed patients who switched from fee-for-service to prepaid plans were among the lowest users of mental health services while enrolled in the fee-for-service sector, whereas depressed patients leaving prepaid plans were among the highest users of mental health care before switching (Sturm et al. 1995) . Like many other adverse selection analyses, the Medical Outcomes Study comparison considered only plan type, not generosity of benefits, which is the focus of this study.
The pre-enrollment approach requires utilization data prior to enrollment, and enrollment information before and after plan switch. Often, however, plan information after a switch is not available, for example, when individuals leave an employer, which is the situation for the data analyzed here. A close relative of the pre-enrollment comparison that remains feasible is a disenrollment comparison, which measures selection through the relationship between service use and subsequent disenrollment behavior. The hypothesis tested in that case is whether treatment users (compared to nonusers) are less likely to disenroll from relatively more generous plans than treatment users in less generous plans.
Variation in Plan Benefits
A fundamental issue for any empirical study of selection is to find sufficiently large sources of variations in benefits, while avoiding confounding factors or reverse causality. Unfortunately, it is impossible to find any truly independent or ''exogenous'' changes in benefits, such as one employer who dramatically increases benefits with no other changes in plan characteristics while a similar employer keeps plan management and benefits constant. Substantial changes in benefit design are rare and often result from mergers, acquisitions, and bankruptcies. Such transitions may affect the attractiveness of a firm to potential employees and may even affect the behavioral health needs of current workers. Senior management personnel often change at the same time, as does the willingness to participate in research studies. For example, one of the longest time-series studies of mental health utilization in employer-based plans was based on a company that provided mental health benefits to more than 100,000 individuals . However, since the company changed ownership in the late 1990s, no additional data have been accessible.
While benefit designs tend to be constant within a firm over time, there is substantial variation in coverage across firms. In fact, this is the primary source of variation in our application, but cross-section comparisons are also weaker designs than natural experiments or, at least in some cases, than pre-post comparisons.
Difficulties observing all relevant plan differences complicate studies of adverse selection. Health plans differ in many dimensions other than benefit generosity, including management of services, network arrangements, or paper work/claims forms for patients. In fact, many prior adverse selection studies paid little attention to benefit design and instead distinguished managed and unmanaged care. However, care management and benefits are substitutes from an actuarial point of view, and less managed plans are typically less generous because they rely more on demand-side cost sharing than managed care plans that have some leverage on the supply side. If individuals primarily choose plans based on management, one may not find any adverse selection when comparing plans by benefits because individuals with the greatest tendency to use substance abuse services enroll in the less managed and less generous plans. Even if unmanaged care for substance abuse treatment has disappeared in the private sector, management procedures differ and management tends to overwhelm even the largest changes in benefit design (Ma and McGuire 1998; Goldman, McCulloch, and Sturm 1998) . Thus, it is essential for this type of analysis to hold the management of treatment services constant to avoid confounding adverse selection due to benefit design with managed care effects. We do this by analyzing plans managed by the same company under identical guidelines.
Endogenous benefit design makes estimating the magnitude of adverse selection more difficult. It is important to understand how likely sources of endogeneity affect estimates of adverse selection and to choose analytic approaches that minimize potential sources of bias. Evidence suggests that employers whose workforce includes more substance abusers impose higher demand-side cost sharing to control costs (Sturm 2000) . In that case, a simple cross-sectional comparison would be biased against finding adverse selection.
The approach used in this application analyzes the difference between new and continuing employees and dependents after the implementation of new managed care benefits. If the discontinued plans were similar to the new plans, the same adverse selection would exist among older employees as among new employees. We do not think that this is the case, although we have no information to verify it because the new plans always entailed a switch in the plan administration. However, based on conversations with senior managers of the managed care organization, we were told that prior plans typically had very limited and less varied benefits. Thus, there was little reason for adverse selection into employers that later instituted generous substance abuse benefits. Moreover, in a context where employers design new benefits around perceptions of their existing member base, we are more likely to overestimate the effect of adverse selection because employers with more generous benefits may have lower-cost continuing members and employers with less generous benefits may have higher-cost continuing members.
Methods

Data
This study uses claims data for 57 employers who contracted with United Behavioral Health (UBH) to administer their alcohol, drug, and mental health benefits to more than 650,000 employees and dependents. The data, covering active plans during the period 1991 to 1997, include information on: benefit design (covered services, cost-sharing requirements, and day, dollar, and episode limits); behavioral health service use (inpatient and outpatient visits, days, and lengths of stay); costs (insurance and out-of-pocket payments); type of members (employees and their dependents); and specialty of behavioral health provider. Employers represent a wide range of industries and have plan members in all 50 states.
From the claims database, we constructed two analytic files structured around the concept of an eligibility year (rather than a calendar year) that begins at the start of plan coverage. The first eligibility year corresponds to the year after the start of employment for new workers and to the year after the start of the managed care carve-out for continuing employees. Comparisons between new and continuing (old) employees in their first year of eligibility and between those who use alcohol-related treatment services in their first year of eligibility and those who never use services form the basis of our two analyses.
Dependent variables. We derived two sets of dependent variables to measure use of alcoholrelated treatment services. The first includes an indicator of receipt of alcohol-related substance abuse treatment services in the first year of eligibility and a measure of total costs of alcohol treatment in the first year of eligibility. Costs were defined as total payments to providers, including insurance payments (both primary and through coordination of benefits), patient deductibles, and patient copayments. We classified separate costs for alcohol treatment according to the primary Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) diagnosis on each individual claim. For members who disenrolled before the end of the eligibility year, costs were annualized using the formula (total costs/ months in plan) * 12. We also defined two different dependent variables for the disenrollment analyses. One is an indicator of disenrollment for specific eligibility years. The other is a measure of the duration of plan membership (censored for individuals still enrolled) measured in months.
Explanatory/stratifying variables. The main explanatory or stratifying variables are: two indicators of plan generosity; an indicator of new vs. continuing member; an indicator of use of substance abuse services for alcohol treatment in the first year of eligibility; and an indicator of employee vs. dependent. We classified benefit generosity along two dimensions: the generosity of cost-sharing requirements and generosity of Table 1 . Definitions of copayments and coverage limit generosity of alcohol treatment coverage Plans with more generous maximums have all of the following features:
• Annual limit of 20 or more inpatient days • Annual limit of 50 or more outpatient days • Lifetime dollar limit of $50,000 or more • Lifetime limit of 60 or more treatment days • Lifetime limit of at least 2 treatments • Lifetime limit of at least 60 sessions Plans with more generous cost-sharing requirements have all of the following features:
• Inpatient coinsurance of 90% or higher • Inpatient admission copayment of $250 or less • Inpatient day/visit copayment of $10 or less • Inpatient treatment copayment of $250 or less • Outpatient coinsurance of at least 90% or higher • Outpatient day/visit copayment of $10 or less • Inpatient treatment copayment of $250 or less • Annual individual deductible of $200 or less • Annual family deductible of $400 or less Note: Plans considered to have ''more generous'' copays have lower deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance compared to less generous plans. benefit maximums. There is no distinction in benefits between alcohol and other drugs, so we generally refer to substance abuse benefits. We defined generosity at one point in time because we found almost no changes in benefit design over the study period in those plans, confirming the general perception that employers try to avoid changing benefit design whenever possible (and why it is difficult to design pre/post studies).
To be considered more generous in each dimension, a plan must have satisfied the condi-tions listed in Table 1 , where we assigned a 100% patient cost-sharing rate for uncovered services. This classification scheme resulted in four types of plans: those with high cost sharing and low coverage limits, those with low cost sharing and low coverage limits, those with high cost sharing and high coverage limits, and those with low cost sharing and high coverage limits.
The 57 plans were fairly evenly distributed across the four types (see Table 2 ). The more generous cost sharing/more generous limit category had the smallest number of plans, and the less generous copayments/less generous limits category had the most, reflecting the fact that most employers offer very limited substance abuse benefits. We did not find any significant patterns in the types of industries represented across the four categories. Finally, an important distinction was whether the plan member was the policyholder (i.e., the employee) or a dependent, and we performed separate analyses. There are too few child dependents treated for alcohol abuse to consider them separately from adult dependents.
In regression analyses, we also included a few other variables to account for potential differences across employers. While there were no management differences across plans that biased results, UBH, employers, and members gain experience with a plan over time and such experience might affect results. We therefore controlled for these time-related effects with variables measuring the calendar year and the age of the plan in a member's first eligibility year.
Socioeconomic variables for individuals are generally absent from insurance data (although we have age and sex for users) and we geocoded those socioeconomic variables by assigning the characteristics of their local environment at the zip-code level based on U.S. census data. We used the percentage nonwhite, median family income, and percentage with a bachelor's degree from census data. Because geocoded variables do not describe the individual but the population in the zip-code area where the individual lives, they cannot be interpreted in the same way as individual socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level (Geronimus, Bound, Neidert 1996) . However, they are very powerful control variables and also very useful at the group level. We also included an indicator of large employer, defined as having at least 10,000 members enrolled in the plan. To the employment duration analysis, we added controls for industry type and geographic region in order to control for the effect of job quality and labor market conditions on employee turnover.
Analytic Approach
Comparison of new and existing plan members by benefit generosity. We used a difference-indifferences approach to test the selection hypothesis by measuring the differences in use of substance abuse benefits (for an alcohol-related diagnosis) between new and old members in more generous plans and compared them to the differences in use between old and new members in less generous plans. In this framework, adverse selection is implied by finding that new members in more generous plans have higher treatment costs than continuing members compared to the same new vs. continuing members' differences in less generous plans. The strength and interpretation of this test depends on the validity of two assumptions, namely that the effect of enrollee cost sharing on demand elasticity is the same for new and continuing workers and that any possible selection among continuing enrollees is uncorrelated with new benefits. The regression equation clarifies the identifying assumptions underlying alternative interpretations of our selection measure. Thus, we write an individual i's use of substance abuse treatment services as:
where B i is an indicator variable measuring benefit generosity, N i is an indicator variable measuring whether the individual is a new member, Z i represents other demographic characteristics, and ⑀ i is a random disturbance. Two parameters measure the impact of benefit generosity on use: ␥ measures the direct effect and measures the differential effect for new members.
The difference-in-differences estimator is generated by evaluating equation 1 for different types of members;D
(2) newϭ1, generousϭ0 n e w ϭ0, generousϭ0
One assumption needed to identify the model is that ␥ does not differ across subgroups. New members are allowed to differ from continuing members (measured by ), but the moral hazard effect does not differ between new and old members. If there were a differential effect, this would be included in the estimate of , which we want to interpret as the adverse selection effect.
Actual phenomena do not always separate quite that nicely into the theoretical concepts of adverse selection or moral hazard. ''Pent-up'' demand among new members might not reflect employment decisions and could be more a reflection of a (temporarily) higher demand elasticity. For example, even if dental benefits did not affect employment or plan enrollment decisions, new employees and their families might take advantage of benefits that cover braces, a pure moral hazard effect that only exists among new members. In contrast, ''pent-up'' demand for pregnancy and childbirth services always has been interpreted as evidence of adverse selection. The use of substance abuse benefits or most other medical services probably falls somewhere in between by being more discretionary than childbirth, but less than orthodontics. Managed care plans substantially attenuate the role of moral hazard due to concurrent utilization review, but our estimate of may be biased upward nevertheless by any residual moral hazard effect that only exists among new members.
Another potentially problematic assumption is that enrollment decisions in the past among continuing members were uncorrelated with new benefits. If the discontinued plans were similar to the new plans, the same adverse selection would exist among older employees as among new employees. As we discussed earlier, we do not think that this is the case. Nevertheless, if adverse selection occurred in the employment pools prior to the benefit changes and was positively correlated with the new benefits, the estimated coefficient would be biased downward. In order to reduce this potential source of bias, we also considered only utilization in the first year of the new plan for continuing employees. This restriction would reduce the potential for positive selection among continuing employees if high users were to leave less generous plans over the course of time.
There is no data to indicate that either potential bias-either upward bias due to higher moral hazard among new members or downward bias due to adverse selection among continuing members-is large or small. A priori, we would expect only the moral hazard bias to be of potential concern, but this is an impression based on informal information from a plan administra-tor and our ability to reduce the potential for selection among continuing workers analytically.
To actually test the parameters, we used a binomial logit to model the probability of any use and a linear regression model of treatment costs per member (not per user). As a sensitivity analysis, we also estimated log-linear costs per member (adding one to individuals with zero costs) and a standard two-part model. Neither alternative affected the interpretation of the results.
Disenrollment over time. We also tested for the presence of adverse selection by examining the relationship between treatment benefit generosity and two measures of member turnover. First, we calculated simple descriptive statistics to compare disenrollment rates in the first three years of plan eligibility by generosity and members' use of substance abuse treatment services in the first eligibility year. In our multivariate analyses, we measured differences in enrollment duration between those who used alcohol-related treatment services in the first year of eligi-bility and those who did not use any form of treatment (for alcohol, mental health, and chemical dependency diagnoses) during the study time period and by plan generosity.
Adverse selection would imply that differences in enrollment duration between users and nonusers would be greater in less generous plans compared to differences in more generous plans. The strength and validity of this result depends on the absence of adverse selection among the nonuser controls. This can be seen in the following regression equation where the instantaneous probability (hazard) of disenrollment is written as:
where B i is an indicator of generous benefits, U i indicates that the individual used treatment services in the first year of plan eligibility, and Z i includes calendar year, plan year, an indicator for very large firms, geocoded sociodemographics (percentage nonwhite, percentage with bachelor's degree, median family income), and indicators of industry type and geographic region. As in the other analysis, the effect of adverse selection is measured by the parameter .
The ability of this estimator to measure adverse selection requires that benefit generosity does not affect membership duration for nonusers such that ␥ ϭ 0. In a context where the generosity of substance abuse treatment benefits tends to mirror the generosity of other behavioral health benefits, we helped to assure that this assumption is met by using as controls individuals who have not used any behavioral health services during the time covered by the data in contrast to people in the ''treatment group,'' who all have used alcohol-related treatment services in their first year of eligibility. Further, we also reduced bias by excluding from the analysis individuals who used alcohol-related treatment only after their first year of eligibility. This helps to assure that members of the treatment group have had similar exposure to the illness in the period following initial enrollment. This strategy helps us avoid individuals who were not alcohol abusers/dependents at the time of the employment decision and thus not subject to adverse selection.
Limitations
There are several limitations associated with the type of data analyzed here. The primary limi-tation is the cross-sectional source of variation because benefit generosity may not be exogenous. In this application, the most likely direction of the bias is towards overstating the effect of adverse selection. The second limitation concerns the simultaneity of treatment benefits and employment choices in our data. Generosity of nonwage benefits is only one of many job features that prospective employees care about. If treatment benefits were exogenous, job features unrelated to treatment benefit generosity would be controlled because they would drop out of equation 2. As we discussed earlier, however, treatment benefit generosity is related to other aspects of employers, so the direction of the bias is not clear. A positive relationship between treatment benefit generosity and job aspects that members of the general population find appealing, such as high wages, would bias findings toward understating the effect of adverse selection. By contrast, a positive relationship between treatment benefit generosity and job aspects that individuals at high risk of treatment use might find appealing-such as flexible hours and a lack of close supervision-would overstate the effect of adverse selection.
The third limitation concerns the generalizability of our results, which depends on the range of substance abuse treatment plans in our database. While managed behavioral health plans account for the majority of private health plans covering alcohol treatment, and UBH covers a substantial proportion of the U.S. population, our data are not sampled randomly. The fact that many individuals with alcohol problems do not perceive themselves as requiring help and do not try to use care is not a limitation for this analysis, which studies whether adverse selection related to substance abuse benefits occurs. Such individuals' decisions about employment and health benefits will not be affected by the generosity of treatment. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the number of treatment users in the first year of eligibility by plan generosity and employment tenure for employees and dependents. As expected, use of any alcohol treatment services Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Plans considered to have ''more generous'' copays have lower deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance compared to ''less generous'' plans.
Results
Descriptive Statistics: Comparison of New and Existing Plan Members by Benefit Generosity
was higher in the most generous plans (with both more generous copays and limits, column 1) than in the least generous plans (column 4) for old (continuing) and new employees and for old and new dependents. For example, a significantly (pϽ.05) larger percentage of old employees in the most generous plans (3.639 per 1,000 employees) used services compared to old employees in the least generous plans (2.629 per 1,000 employees).
There is no evidence in the descriptive statistics that new employees or dependents in the most generous plans were more likely to use services than old members. Use rates for new members were higher than use rates for continuing employees and dependents in plans with more generous copays and less generous limits (statistically significant for employees, but not for dependents). However, higher use rates for new members compared to old members could reflect the greater likelihood in these plans that old members had exceeded benefit limits. Consistent with the idea that individuals at high risk of treatment use avoid plans with less generous treatment benefits, use rates were lower for new employees in the least generous plans, but this difference is not statistically significant. Table 4 shows total costs for alcohol treat-ment per member. Costs are higher in the most generous plans compared to the least generous plans for both old and new members. Regarding the selection hypothesis, however, differences in per member treatment costs between new and old members across plans appear unrelated to generosity, paralleling the descriptive statistics on any use in Table 3 . New members have lower costs than old members with the exception of employees in plans with more generous copays and less generous limits, but differences are not statistically significant.
Regression Analyses
Both Tables 3 and 4 show descriptive statistics and do not adjust for other measured confounding factors that can be controlled for in the multivariate analyses reported in the subsequent tables. Table 5 presents coefficient estimates for regression models of the logit probability of using alcohol treatment services in the first year of eligibility (columns 1 and 2) and total treatment costs (columns 3 and 4) in the first year of eligibility for both employees and dependents. The difference-in-differences is estimated by the coefficients on the interactions between generosity and the new employee indicator. Consistent with the descriptive statistics, the two sets of multivariate results provide no evidence of selection by new employees into plans with more generous treatment benefits for both employees and dependents. Only the interaction term that is statistically different from zero is the one that measures the effect of more generous copayments on new employees in the total cost model. However, this coefficient is negative (Ϫ5.114) suggesting that new employees incur lower, rather than higher costs-the opposite of what would be expected under adverse selection. The other coefficients suggest that different processes lead to treatment use and overall treatment costs for employees and dependents. The negative relationship between the calendar year in the first year of eligibility and treatment use and cost is the most consistent relationship across the four models, reflecting the general trend toward reduced expenditures for alcohol services over time. Later calendar years reduce the probability of treatment use and treatment costs for employees and reduce only treatment costs for dependents. The influence of geocoded controls varies across model and member type with the largest effect on the treatment costs of dependents. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics on disenrollment by the member's year of eligibility and whether the member used alcohol treatment services in the first eligibility year. After the first three years, the number of users is too small in Note: Plans considered to have ''more generous'' copays have lower deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance compared to ''less generous'' plans. all but the most generous plans to show comparisons for other years. Disenrollment rates for both users and nonusers of alcohol treatment decrease dramatically as plans become more generous in offering substance abuse benefits. At the same time, disenrollment rates are generally higher for users in each eligibility year compared to nonusers. Difference-in-differences calculations for each eligibility year for both employees and dependents may suggest evidence of adverse selection because the difference between the disenrollment for users and nonusers in less generous plans is greater than the similar difference in more generous plans. However, the descriptive results in Table 6 are not adjusted for other observed differences across plans.
Descriptive Statistics: Disenrollment over Time
Multivariate Analysis
We formally test for an interaction between plan generosity and use of alcohol treatment in the first year on the member's duration in the plan using Cox proportional hazard models (Table 7) . We use geocoded socioeconomic variables, employer size, industry type, and geographic region to control for other individual and marketlevel factors that affect employment duration. Coefficients greater than one mean that a higher value of this variable is associated with a higher hazard of disenrollment and consequently shorter membership in the plan. Consistent with evidence suggesting that substance abusers have higher rates of job turnover, the coefficient on use of alcohol treatment services is greater than one (significant only for employees), indicating a higher hazard rate compared to nonusers. Coefficients on more generous plans are significant and less than one (with the exception of more generous limits in the dependents model), indicating a lower hazard of disenrollment compared to those employed in firms with less generous benefits.
The interactions between generosity and user status test for adverse selection. More generous plans would experience adverse selection in retaining users of treatment services if the coefficients were less than one. However, only one of the four key interaction terms is significantly different from zero and its estimated value is greater than one, which is inconsistent with the selection hypothesis. Thus, adjusting for other covariates changes the conclusion about adverse selection through disenrollment based on the descriptive statistics.
Discussion
This paper measured whether individuals likely to use alcohol treatment services disproportionately select and remain in plans offering more generous alcohol treatment benefits. The results do not support the adverse selection hypothesis. We find no evidence that treatment costs of new members compared to old members are higher in firms that offer more generous treatment benefits than in firms with more limited benefits; similarly, we find no evidence that alcohol treatment users remain disproportionately enrolled longer in plans with more generous benefits.
The results need to be interpreted in light of the study limitations. We traded off external validity (generalizability) by considering only plans managed by one behavioral health carveout in exchange for improved internal validity. Considering other plan types could introduce confounding of enrollment decisions due to benefit design with other plan characteristics (which is suggested by the fact that much of the adverse selection literature studied plan type rather than benefit design), but could provide other insights. Even though our data selection narrowed the scope of plans and excluded the most likely confounding factor (plan characteristics other than benefit design), other unmeasured confounders remain an issue. It is not clear that study designs other than cross-sectional comparisons will be possible. We explored the possibility of pre/post comparisons, but among several thousand employer-sponsored plans only a small number made significant changes in benefits over time that did not involve other changes in plan administration (such as switching to managed care).
This study differed in one important conceptual dimension from most adverse selection studies in the literature, which typically have focused on a single purchaser, like Harvard University, the University of California, or Medicare. There were two reasons for our approach. First, employers primarily are concerned about adverse selection into their workforce; shifts in enrollment across offered health plans within an employer's existing workforce is a secondary issue (though not for health plans). Second, the opportunity to switch easily between plans with (.017)** AL user (0,1) ϫ more generous limits (0,1) AL user (0,1) ϫ more generous copays (0,1) different behavioral health benefits is unusual. Moreover, employment is a prerequisite for most plan switching. The two approaches answer different questions; we believe our approach is more relevant to the issue of whether benefit generosity for substance abuse treatment causes adverse selection.
Beyond the question of adverse selection, this analysis also provides some other new results for the policy debate. Most importantly, there is no evidence that alcohol treatment displays any stored-up demand effect, regardless of plan generosity. New members do not have increased use, even in more generous plans, and this is quite different from studies of medical services. However, the evidence parallels results from the Medical Outcomes Study for depression (Sturm et al. 1995) . It is possible that individuals with alcohol, drug, or mental health problems find it more difficult to reconnect with a new health care system than individuals with general medical conditions. High patient copayments for substance abuse treatment in many insurance plans are likely to exacerbate this access problem.
The findings of no adverse selection and no stored-up demand effect are relevant for the policy debate about improved benefits for alcohol and drug treatment. While this study provides an important first data point, it is far from being the final answer on this topic; other studies with complementary strengths are needed for a comprehensive picture.
